

HASALMUN'25



JOINT CRISIS COMMITTEE

STUDY GUIDE

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"Youth will shape the world"

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1. Letters from the Secretary-General and Under-Secretary-General

1.1. Letter from the Secretary-General

Dear Delegates of the Joint-Crisis Committee,

It is my utmost pleasure and honour to welcome each and every one of you to the 12th annual session of HASALMUN and specifically to the JCC committee. I am proud to say, on behalf of our whole academic and organisation team, that every detail of this conference was devised with careful dedication and sincere enthusiasm so as to provide all of you with pleasant and unforgettable memories.

MUN is not just about building connections, the value of it goes much deeper; MUN is about bonding over world issues. It is about realising how all human beings are bound by different problems and understanding that the world is waiting for courageous, intellectual, kind-hearted leaders and individuals to heal the broken hearts, and rebuild the shadowed dreams.

HASALMUN has, since its day of foundation, been a stage where everyone is provided with the opportunity to express, debate, and negotiate. Every delegate is received with the greatest amount of excitement, happiness and pride; because, as young individuals ourselves, we know the importance of being recognized as worthy individuals. I assure you that HASALMUN'25 will be a place for growth, in every possible context.

This year, JCC will be tackling an issue that requires great technical knowledge, a versatile approach, deep thought processes, carefully written directives and heated debates. Luckily, our irreplaceable Under-Secretary General **Mr. Umut Işık Usluyer** has prepared this amazing study guide with invaluable efforts in order to ensure that all delegates receive every piece of information they need from this document alone. I thank him for being the greatest in his job and his marvellous commitments to the conference. Moreover, I also want to thank our academic assistant **Mr. Sarp Soyakca** for his contributions to the study guide, committee and conference.

Last, but definitely not the least, I want to thank you delegates for making this conference truly meaningful. Without your words and actions, HASALMUN would not be what it is today. Thank you to all the youthful minds for adding value into this conference and the world we live in. Youth will shape the world!

Best wishes & Yours sincerely,

Öykü Tekman

Secretary-General of HASALMUN'25

1.2. Letter from the Under-Secretary-General

Most distinguished delegates of the JCC: Cuban Missile Crisis,

It is my utmost pleasure to welcome you to our committee. We, Umut Işık USLUYER as your Under-Secretary-General and Sarp SOYAKCA as your academic assistant, are honored to serve as you for the duration of the HASALMUN'25. It wouldn't be wrong to say that the writing process of this guide has been nothing but a great journey to reflect the history and complex relations behind the crisis between two giant superpowers in which any wrong move may cause the ultimate destruction of our homes, memories, beloved ones and most importantly our right to live in peace and harmony. You, as the delegate, will have the burden to protect the lives of innocent people. It is your duty to fight for our hard-earned peace against the evil; brute force, bad faith, injustice, oppression and persecution. Against them, I am certain that the right will prevail.

In some parts of the guide, you may encounter some parts that are redacted. Do not fear, those parts are easy to decipher and I know that you guys can find how to do it. Even if you can't, do not hesitate to contact me via email (uusluyer@ogr.iu.edu.tr). See you all at the conference.

Best Regards,

Umut Işık USLUYER

Under-Secretary-General of the Joint Crisis Committee: Cuban Missile Crisis

2. Introduction to the Committee

The year is 1962,

Across the globe, life seems calm. In the United States, children are sipping their Coca-Cola in pastel-colored diners. Families gather around their black and white televisions, watching a new and magnificent show called *The Beverly Hillbillies*. Husbands go to work to provide for their families while wives stay behind to take care of the home. For a basic human, everything is cheap and affordable. These are good years to remember for sure, some may even call this era where “The American Dream” becomes a reality. A bastion for freedom.

On the opposite side of the globe shines the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Proud workers of the Union marching in May Day Parades, factories hum with pride and unity of the proletariat. Every day starts with the teachings of Marx, from schools to the streets Lenin is everywhere. A true bastion for world revolution.

It is a world on the surface that feels like moving forward, leaving the atrocities and brutality of the past behind.

But, unfortunately, this isn't the case. A different reality is brewing in secret corners of the world. One force is trying to destroy another. Missile silos being constructed one after another, bomber shelters being stocked up, one nuclear warhead after another, Surveillance airplanes prowling silently at the edge of the foreign skies, ideologies sharpened into weapons. The Cold War, once a fragile chess game, is now a loaded gun where one fired bullet may cause a chain reaction that can lead to the extinction of our species as a whole.

On one side, the capitalist West led by the United States and its allies is determined to contain the threat of communism by any means one can imagine: Coup d'états, assassinations, supplying paramilitary groups to even massacres. On the other side, the communist countries like the USSR and PRC are pushing against these threats with revolutions, hard power, and alliances.

Now, we will turn back in time for just three years when a small Caribbean nation managed to change its fate: Cuba. In 1959, Fidel Castro's revolution overthrew the U.S.-backed Batista regime. For the United States, this was more than a diplomatic loss. It was a threat on their doorstep. Covert operations followed: failed invasions, assassination attempts, sabotage. Yet the island remained defiant. Will of the people managed to beat imperialistic ambitions.

Of course, one man's treasure is another man's treasure. Where the United States sees a failed communist state, the Soviets see an opportunity: a strategic beacon, a willing partner to fight against the Imperialists, and most importantly a place to use to counter Jupiter Missiles in Turkey and Italy.

As the world holds its breath, you, the delegate, will either save the future of the earth or leave it to darkness.

3. Historical Background

3.1. Post-WW2 and Iron Curtain

At the end of World War II, huge swaths of Europe and Asia had been reduced to ruins. Borders were redrawn and homecomings, expulsions, and burials were under way. But the massive efforts to rebuild had just begun. When the war began in the late 1930s, the world's population was approximately 2 billion. In less than a decade, the war between the Axis and the Allied powers had resulted in 80 million deaths -- killing off about 4 percent of the whole world. Allied forces now became occupiers, taking control of Germany, Japan, and much of the territory they had formerly ruled. Efforts were made to permanently dismantle the war-making abilities of those nations, as factories were destroyed and former leadership was removed or prosecuted. War crimes trials took place in Europe and Asia, leading to many executions and prison sentences. Millions of Germans and Japanese were forcibly expelled from territories they called home. Allied occupations and United Nations decisions led to many long-lasting problems in the future, including the tensions that created East and West Germany, and divergent plans on the Korean Peninsula that led to the creation of North and South Korea and -- the Korean War in 1950. The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine paved the way for Israel to declare its independence in 1948 and marked the start of the

continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. The growing tensions between Western powers and the Soviet Eastern Bloc developed into the Cold War, and the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons raised the very real specter of an unimaginable World War III if common ground could not be found.

From the end of World War II in 1945 until the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Iron Curtain was a political metaphor used to describe the political and later physical boundary dividing Europe into two separate areas. The phrase refers to the Soviet Union's (USSR) attempts to prevent open communication between itself, its satellite governments, and the West, as well as its allies and neutral states. The nations affiliated with or impacted by the Soviet Union were located on the east side of the Iron Curtain, whereas NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) members, nations affiliated with or impacted by the United States, and allegedly neutral nations were located on the west side. Separate international economic and military alliances were developed on each side of the Iron Curtain. It later became a term for the 7,000-kilometer-long (4,300 mi) physical barrier of fences, walls, minefields, and watchtowers that divided the "east" and "west". The Berlin Wall was also part of this physical barrier.

The nations to the east of the Iron Curtain were Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the USSR; however, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR have since ceased to exist. Countries that made up the USSR were Russia, Belarus, Latvia, Ukraine, Estonia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. The events that demolished the Iron Curtain started with peaceful opposition in Poland, and continued into Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. Romania became the only socialist state in Europe to overthrow its government with violence.

3.2. End of the U.S. Nuclear Monopoly

The U.S. Nuclear Monopoly had a profound impact on foreign relations and strategic decisions right after World War II. With no other nation possessing nuclear weapons, the U.S. was able to assert its dominance on the global stage, influencing diplomatic negotiations and alliances, particularly in Europe. This monopoly allowed America to project power while

detering adversaries, shaping postwar policies aimed at containing communism and establishing a favorable order in international relations.

The U.S. Nuclear Monopoly significantly influenced international treaties during the early Cold War by providing leverage in negotiations aimed at controlling nuclear proliferation. Treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were framed within the context of American dominance in nuclear capabilities. The U.S. used its monopoly to advocate for arms control measures that sought to prevent other nations from acquiring similar weapons while maintaining its own strategic advantage.

The Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1949, ending the United States' monopoly on nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a conventional and nuclear arms race that persisted until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Andrei Gromyko was Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and is the longest-serving foreign minister in the world.

The RDS-1 , also known as Izdeliye 501 and First Lightning was the nuclear bomb used in the Soviet Union's first nuclear weapon test. It was detonated on 29 August 1949 at 7:00 a.m., at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakh SSR, after top-secret research and development as part of the Soviet atomic bomb project.

To test the effects of the new weapon, workers constructed houses made of wood and bricks, along with a bridge, and a simulated metro railway in the vicinity of the test site. Armoured hardware and approximately 50 aircraft were also brought to the testing grounds as well as over 1,500 animals to test the bomb's effects on life. In a sector of artillery about 100 guns and mortars were placed at distances ranging from 250 to 1,800 meters from ground zero. At distances 500 to 550 meters from ground zero artillery pieces were either totally destroyed or needed factory repair. The resulting data showed the RDS explosion to be 50% more destructive than originally estimated by its engineers.

3.3. Further Deterioration of the U.S .- U.S.S.R. Relations

The transition from the U.S. Nuclear Monopoly to mutual nuclear capabilities with the Soviet Union fundamentally altered global security strategies. As both superpowers developed significant arsenals, the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) emerged, reshaping how states approached military conflict and diplomacy. This shift led to a more cautious stance in international relations, where direct confrontations were avoided due to the catastrophic potential of nuclear war, ultimately influencing arms control negotiations and military strategies throughout the Cold War.

When John F. Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his key election issues was an alleged "missile gap" with the Soviets. In fact the US at that time was ahead of the Soviets and by an increasingly wide margin. In 1961 the Soviets had four R-7 Semyorka intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); by October 1962, some intelligence estimates indicated a figure of 75.

The US had 170 ICBMs and was quickly building more. It also had eight *George Washington*- and *Ethan Allen*-class ballistic missile submarines, with the capability to launch 16 Polaris missiles, each with a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km). The Soviet First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, increased the perception of a 'missile gap' when he boasted to the world that the Soviets were building missiles "like sausages", but Soviet missile numbers and capabilities were nowhere close to his assertions. The Soviet Union had medium-range ballistic missiles in quantity, about 700, but they were unreliable and inaccurate. The US had a considerable advantage in the total number of nuclear warheads (27,000 against 3,600) and in the technology required for accurate delivery. The US also led in missile defensive capabilities, naval and air power. The Soviets had a two-to-one advantage in conventional ground forces, particularly in field guns and tanks in the European theatre.

Nikita Khrushchev also thought Kennedy was weak. This impression was confirmed by the President's response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, particularly to the building of the Berlin Wall by East Germany to prevent its citizens from emigrating to the West. The half-hearted nature of the Bay of Pigs invasion reinforced his impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet aide wrote, "too young, intellectual, not prepared well for

decision making in crisis situations... too intelligent and too weak". Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev said, "I know for certain that Kennedy doesn't have a strong background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge." He told his son Sergei that in Cuba, Kennedy "would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree".

4. U.S. Nuclear Posturing near Soviet Borders

4.1. U.S. Deployment of Jupiter Missiles in Türkiye and Italy

By 1957, U.S. officials feared that the so-called "missile gap" between the United States and Soviet Union was closing. Despite the fact that the U.S. has the superiority in long range bombers and submarine-launched missiles, the U.S. kept searching for a better deterrent. The United States government found the solution to their problem by placing *Jupiter Missiles* in Turkey and Italy. According to the United States officials, this move would send a great message on how the U.S. could easily and effectively strike the Soviet Union with nuclear force in case of retaliatory, or even first, strike. They believed that this would play a crucial role in the psychological and strategic aspects of the struggle between the two superpowers.

Additionally, the deployment served a NATO cohesion purpose. Türkiye and Italy were key allies located on the Soviet Union's southern flank. By stationing nuclear weapons on their soil, the U.S. reinforced its commitment to defending Europe, thereby reassuring its allies and discouraging them from seeking independent nuclear capabilities. This move was also partly a response to internal NATO dynamics; some nations question America's willingness to risk its own cities in defense of Europe. The presence of American nuclear arms in those countries makes that commitment tangible.

4.2. Soviet Backlash

To the Soviet Union, the placement of Jupiter MRBMs in Turkey, just across its southern border, is a direct provocation—an unmistakable sign that the United States is willing to weaponize proximity and exploit geographic leverage. Although the Soviets publicly downplay their concern to maintain an image of strength, internally, Kremlin leadership is outraged. They see the deployment as a violation of the strategic balance and an existential threat to Soviet national security.

Nikita Khrushchev views the American move not only as hypocritical but also as escalatory. While the U.S. justified its Jupiter deployments as defensive and stabilizing, the Soviets believed that Washington was establishing a “nuclear noose” around them, tightening the pressure on Soviet military and political freedom of action. Accordingly, there are rumors that Soviets are looking for a response and they may have found the perfect match for that.

5. Cuba: Vive la Revolución

5.1. Cuban Revolution and Castro’s Rise to Power

The Cuban Revolution resulted from rising opposition to the government of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Batista assumed power in 1952 when he led a coup against President Carlos Prío Socarrás. Once Batista forced his way into power, he voided the constitution and paved the way for an era of government corruption. This gave rise to a revolution that harnessed significant support from the Cuban population. Batista’s dictatorship was a stark contrast from his prior experience as the leader of Cuba when he legitimately served as Cuban president from 1940 to 1944. During this period, Cuba witnessed economic growth and stability, and roads, schools, and hospitals were built. Leading Cuba in 1952, however, he quickly turned to violence as a means of securing his power. Once in office the second time, he abandoned the constitution and suspended elections and opposition parties.

Fidel Castro, who was running for office as a member of the Cuban People's Party prior to Batista's seizure of power, became the leader of the revolution. Known as the 26th of July Movement, in 1953, Castro led an armed raid against the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Most of the insurgents were killed by Batista's military forces. Castro managed to escape the battle but was subsequently arrested and imprisoned. This solidified Castro's position as a revolutionary leader. Freed from prison, he fled to Mexico, where he raised a small guerilla army of Cuban exiles. In November 1956, Castro and some 80 men sailed from Mexico to Cuba to attack Batista's regime. Within days of their arrival, Batista's forces attacked the guerillas, and only some 20 men, including Castro and Che Guevara, survived and made it into the Sierra Maestra mountains. From there, Castro was able to gather new members and begin a classic guerilla campaign.

From the Sierra Maestra mountains, Castro and his growing band of guerrillas launched a sustained campaign against Batista's forces, gaining increasing support from peasants, workers, and students disillusioned with the dictatorship. The movement skillfully used propaganda, portraying themselves as champions of justice and freedom against a corrupt and repressive regime. Over the next two years, the guerrillas expanded their control over rural areas, disrupting government communications and supply lines while inspiring widespread resistance. International attention also grew, as reports of Batista's brutal tactics and the revolution's popularity spread. By late 1958, Batista's regime was crumbling under the pressure of military defeats, mass protests, and dwindling support from the United States, which had grown wary of his increasingly oppressive rule. On January 1, 1959, Batista fled the country, and Fidel Castro's forces marched triumphantly into Havana, marking the triumph of the Cuban Revolution and the beginning of a new political era for the island nation.

Initially, the United States government viewed the Cuban Revolution with cautious optimism. Although the Eisenhower administration was wary of Castro's revolutionary rhetoric, many U.S. officials hoped that Castro would moderate his policies and maintain economic ties beneficial to American business interests. Cuba was, after all, a key supplier of sugar to the U.S. market, and American companies had substantial investments in Cuban industries and real estate. However, as Castro quickly moved to nationalize American-owned properties and implement sweeping social reforms, including land redistribution and the closing of casinos that had long been tied to U.S. organized crime, Washington's stance

hardened. The U.S. government grew increasingly concerned about the revolution's leftist orientation and its potential alignment with the Soviet Union amid the broader Cold War struggle.

As diplomatic relations deteriorated, the United States began supporting anti-Castro exile groups and covert operations aimed at destabilizing the Cuban government.

5.2. Bay of Pigs Invasion

On the 17th of April 1961, U.S. finally pushed for the initiative to destroy Castro's regime.

Orchestrated by the United States and the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front (DRF), a group of exiles opposing Fidel Castro's revolution and directly funded and supported by the U.S. government, made

The first mishap occurred on April 15, 1961, when eight bombers left Nicaragua to bomb Cuban airfields. The CIA had used obsolete World War II B-26 bombers, and painted them to look like Cuban air force planes. The bombers missed many of their targets and left most of Castro's air force intact. As news broke of the attack, photos of the repainted U.S. planes became public and revealed American support for the invasion. President Kennedy cancelled a second air strike.

On April 17, the Cuban-exile invasion force, known as Brigade 2506, landed at beaches along the Bay of Pigs and immediately came under heavy fire. Cuban planes strafed the invaders, sank two escort ships, and destroyed half of the exile's air support. Bad weather hampered the ground force, which had to work with soggy equipment and insufficient ammunition.

Over the next 24 hours, Castro ordered roughly 20,000 troops to advance toward the beach, and the Cuban air force continued to control the skies. As the situation grew increasingly grim, President Kennedy authorized an "air-umbrella" at dawn on April 19—six unmarked American fighter planes took off to help defend the brigade's B-26 aircraft. But the planes arrived an hour late, most likely confused by the change in time zones between

Nicaragua and Cuba. They were shot down by the Cubans, and the invasion was crushed later that day.

Some exiles escaped to the sea, while the rest were killed or rounded up and imprisoned by Castro's forces. Almost 1,200 members of Brigade 2506 surrendered, and more than 100 were killed.

After painstaking negotiations by James B. Donovan, Castro finally agreed to release the prisoners in exchange for \$53,000,000 worth of food and medicine. Between December 1962 and July 1965 the survivors were returned to the United States.

The failure of the invasion damaged U.S. credibility, emboldens the Castro regime, and significantly deepened the Cold War rift between the United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

5.3. Further CIA Backed Terrorism and Sabotage Attempts

Starting in 1959, under the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. government had the Central Intelligence Agency recruit operatives in Cuba to carry out terrorism and sabotage, kill civilians, and cause economic damage.

In 1961 the U.S. government, through the military and the CIA, engaged in a far more extensive campaign of state-sponsored terrorism against civilian and military targets in Cuba. The terrorist attacks killed significant numbers of civilians. The U.S. armed, trained, funded and directed the terrorists, most of whom were Cuban expatriates. Andrew Bacevich, Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University, wrote of the campaign.

In its determination to destroy the Cuban Revolution, the Kennedy administration heedlessly embarked upon what was, in effect, a program of state-sponsored terrorism.

In this matter, came the Operation Mongoose. Operation Mongoose was designed to do what the Bay of Pigs invasion failed to do: remove the Communist Castro regime from power in Cuba. Orchestrated by the CIA and Department of Defense under the direction of

Edward Lansdale, Operation Mongoose constituted a multiplicity of plans with wide-ranging purpose and scope. Lansdale presented the Project's six-phase schedule to Attorney General Kennedy on February 20, 1962, and President Kennedy received a briefing on the operation's components on March 16, 1962. Lansdale outlined the coordinated program of political, psychological, military, sabotage, and intelligence operations, as well as proposed assassination attempts on key political leaders, including Castro. Monthly components of the operation were to be set in place to destabilize the communist regime, including the publication of Anti-Castro propaganda, provision of armaments for militant opposition groups, and establishment of guerilla bases throughout the country, all leading up to preparations for an October 1962 military intervention in Cuba. Some (though not all) of the planned Operation Mongoose actions were deployed during 1962, but the military intervention did not occur, and the Castro regime remained in power.

6. A New Alliance

Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution, while not explicitly communist at first, embodied anti-imperialism, wealth redistribution, and liberation from foreign control, principles deeply aligned with Soviet Marxism-Leninism. For the USSR, isolated after the Hungarian Uprising and facing NATO pressures, Cuba represented a critical foothold in the Americas. Following Castro's nationalization of U.S.-owned assets and the subsequent diplomatic break by the Eisenhower administration, Cuba and the Soviet Union formalized diplomatic relations in 1960, accelerating political, economic, and military cooperation. The USSR provided Cuba with essential oil, food, machinery, and industrial equipment, establishing a trade system that circumvented U.S. embargoes in exchange for valuable Cuban sugar exports. Soviet military advisors arrived to modernize Cuba's defenses and prepare for possible U.S. aggression. Despite public displays of socialist unity, tensions simmered beneath the surface; Castro fiercely guarded his independence, while Khrushchev viewed Cuba as both an ideological ally and a strategic asset, important, yet not worth igniting a nuclear conflict over. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 pushed Castro to formally declare Cuba a Marxist-Leninist state, strengthening Soviet support and signaling defiance to Washington. Cuba's proximity to the United States directly challenged the Monroe Doctrine, a cornerstone of U.S. policy, and Khrushchev saw the island as leverage against American missile bases in Turkey and

Italy. Though their objectives differed, Castro's pursuit of security and Khrushchev's strategic deterrence aligned sufficiently to forge a potent, if fragile, alliance. By 1962, Soviet influence permeated every aspect of Cuban society and defense. While publicly symbolizing resistance against Western imperialism, the partnership was a complex and volatile power play that irrevocably altered the geopolitical landscape, setting the stage for a confrontation that may soon grip the world.



7. FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

Subject: [REDACTED]

Date: August 29, 1962

Recipient: President of the United States

Summary:

Recent intelligence gathered through aerial reconnaissance and human intelligence sources suggests that the [REDACTED] may be engaged in a covert military buildup on the island of [REDACTED]. While the full extent and purpose of this activity remain under analysis, available evidence strongly indicates the presence of [REDACTED] personnel and equipment consistent with surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and, potentially, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) infrastructure. The implications of this development pose a significant challenge to continental U.S. security and the current balance of power in the Western Hemisphere.

I. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OBSERVATIONS:

U-2 high-altitude surveillance flights conducted over central and western [REDACTED] between August 29 and September 7 have revealed the following developments:

- **Construction of Six SAM Sites:** At least six fixed positions consistent with SA-2 "Guideline" surface-to-air missile batteries have been identified. The layout of these sites closely matches [REDACTED] defensive configurations previously observed in [REDACTED].

- **Suspicious Military Convoys:** Movement of heavy military equipment—most notably long-range transport trucks and what appear to be mobile erector platforms—has been documented near [REDACTED].
- **Restricted Zones:** Several previously accessible areas are now under strict control, with [REDACTED] military roadblocks denying civilian entry. These perimeters overlap with newly paved access roads, heavy machinery, and elongated concrete slabs, which may serve as missile launch pads.

II. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE:

- **Defections and Local Sources:** Two recent defectors—one [REDACTED] dock worker and one [REDACTED] technician—have independently reported the arrival of [REDACTED] “engineers” and “special units” in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ports. They reference night-time offloading of large, sealed containers from [REDACTED] freighters, often under armed guard.
- **Linguistic Indicators:** Intercepted [REDACTED] military communications contain increased use of [REDACTED] phrases and terminology, suggesting a growing embedded [REDACTED] presence. [REDACTED] officers appear to be taking direct orders from [REDACTED] advisors in several regions.

III. [REDACTED] INTENTIONS AND STRATEGY:

While [REDACTED] continues to publicly assert that all assistance to [REDACTED] is “defensive in nature,” the scale and specificity of the equipment observed raises questions about their true strategic objective. Possibilities include:

1. Deterrence: The [REDACTED] may seek to create a nuclear counterweight to U.S. [REDACTED] stationed in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
2. Political Leverage: By installing MRBMs in [REDACTED], the [REDACTED] could gain bargaining power in future arms control negotiations.
3. Crisis Planning: The buildup may be a contingency effort, preparing for a potential U.S. invasion of the island following the [REDACTED].

IV. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS:

Should evidence confirm the presence of offensive nuclear capabilities in [REDACTED], the following risks must be immediately addressed:

- Threat to U.S. Cities: MRBMs launched from [REDACTED] would place nearly the entire Eastern Seaboard and much of the Midwest within a 10-15 minute strike range.
- Escalation Risk: An overt [REDACTED] missile presence in [REDACTED] may provoke widespread panic and demand immediate U.S. military response, risking direct confrontation with the USSR.
- Credibility and Doctrine: U.S. failure to respond may embolden [REDACTED] expansionism elsewhere, undermining the Monroe Doctrine and NATO deterrence credibility.

CONCLUSION:

There is mounting evidence to suggest a deliberate and escalating [REDACTED] military buildup in [REDACTED]. While direct proof of offensive nuclear missiles has not yet been confirmed, the

current trajectory of developments points toward that possibility. We urge immediate presidential attention and discretion as this situation evolves.

End of Report

Classification: TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

Distribution: POTUS, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence

GOOD LUCK!



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